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RETRIBUTION: NEW YORK'S ANSWER TO THE
MULTIPLE FELONY OFFENDER
I. Introduction
On April 18, 1983, sixteen New York state senators introduced an
act to amend section 70.30(1)(c) of the New York Penal Law. 1 The
amendment (the amended provision) substantially increases the maxi-
mum prison term for multiple felony offenders. 2 It applies to those
offenders who commit more than two violent felony crimes. 3 Six
weeks later, on May 31, 1983, Governor Cuomo signed the amended
provision into immediate effect. 4
Reaction to the amended provision came swiftly, raising issues
regarding its potency in affecting the crime rate. 5 While some legisla-
tors and district attorneys praised the amended provision because of
its intended effect of keeping the criminals off the streets and in jail,6
other legislators and criminal justice experts criticized the act as im-
pulsive and impractical. 7 These views reflect the ongoing debate re-
garding the basis on which the criminal sentencing system rests.
1. Senators Tully, Dunne, Farley, Floss, Flynn, Johnson, Kehoe, Knorr, Lack,
Lavalle, Levy, Marino, Padavan, Pisani, Trunzo, and Volker (at the request of the
Governor) presented the bill. N.Y.S. 5237, Reg. Sess., 1983.
2. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.30(l)(c)(ii)-(iii)(McKinney Supp. 1983).
3. Id.
4. 1983 N.Y. Laws 2755.
5. N.Y. Times, June 4, 1983, at 25, col. 6.
6. In the Memorandum of the State Executive Department, Governor Cuomo
stated that this amendment will provide that the perpetrator of such crimes receive a
sentence in proportion to the offense committed. 1983 N.Y. Laws 2755. The Memo-
randum of the Legislative Representative of the City of New York stated that the
amended provision prevents defendants from being given a "free ride" for multiple
felonies committed after the imposition of the first sentence. Also expressed was
support for the concept of the punishment more appropriately fitting the crime, and
the possible deterrent effects of such a provision. 1983 N.Y. Laws 2462, 2463. Several
district attorneys stated that the amended provision will lower the crime rate by
deterring other potential offenders, and will no longer allow offenders who commit
multiple crimes in a spree to be given sentences that are only slightly longer than
those they would have received had they committed one or two violent felony
offenses. N.Y. Times, June 4, 1983, at 25, col. 6. Manhattan District Attorney Robert
M. Morganthau expressed approval of the amendment because it corrected sentenc-
ing disparities. Additionally, the Advisory Commission on Criminal Sanctions had,
in a 1982 report, recommended increasing the term of imprisonment to the 50 year
maximum. Id.
7. N.Y. Times, June 4, 1983, at 25, col. 6. Some legislators and criminologists
claim that the old law was passed in reaction to the "diner incident" that occurred in
Nassau County on May 29, 1982, over the Memorial Day weekend. Id. Several
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In the United States, there is no absolute legislative declaration
proclaiming which, if any, philosophical principles are used to justify
sentencing offenders.' However, sentencing policies are necessary for
the criminal justice system so that proper responses can be made to the
offender's conduct. Therefore, whenever any statutory amendment to
the penal law is passed, the enactment should reflect a coherent penal
function in order to promote the stability regarding the predictibility
of sentences and further the aims of criminal justice.'
This Note first discusses the major consequences of the rationales for
criminal punishment.' 0 It then examines the rationale of the amended
provision. It will be shown that, although the amended provision
interacts with several theories of punishment, retribution against the
multiple felony offender is its primary purpose and effect. " This Note
concludes that the amendment to New York Penal Law section
70.30(1)(c) is entitled to prompt judicial recognition and acceptance
as a retributivist response to the multiple felony offender.12
II. The Amended Provision
Before the amended provision was passed, Penal Law section
70.30(1)(c) provided that a defendant convicted of multiple felony
gunmen robbed a parking lot in Kings County by forcing their victims to disrobe and
relinquish possession of their valuables. One victim was assaulted. The gunmen stole
an automobile and later proceeded to enter a private residence. The sixteen occu-
pants were forced at gunpoint to disrobe, turn over their possessions, and commit
various sex acts. Then the defendants drove to a diner and proceeded, again at
gunpoint, to force the 75 patrons to disrobe and surrender their valuables. Several
customers were assaulted and two were shot. Many of the customers were forced to
commit sexual acts on the defendants and/or each other; some customers were
repeatedly raped. After leaving the diner, the defendants were spotted by a patrol
car. One of them fired at an officer, who returned fire. All of the defendants were
eventually apprehended. N.Y. Times, May 30, 1983, at 26, col. 4. See also 1983 N.Y.
Laws 2462. Despite the fact that consecutive indeterminate sentences could be im-
posed, the then existing law limited the term of imprisonment to a maximum of
thirty years.
Several criticisms arose regarding the amendment's practical effect on the ever-
increasing problem of prison overcrowding. The Executive Director of the Coalition
for Criminal Justice stated that "[t]here was no attempt by the sponsors to ascertain
the number of cases that might be affected, or to calculate the effect on overcrowd-
ing." N.Y. Times, June 4, 1983, at 25, col. 6.
8. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 106 (1973).
9. Pugsley, Retributivism: A Just Basis for Criminal Sentences, 7 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 379, 380 (1979).
10. See infra notes 54-187 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 211-17 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 211-38 and accompanying text.
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offenses,' 3 other than a class A felony,' 4 and sentenced to consecu-
tive, 15 indeterminate' prison terms would serve no more than a maxi-
mum of twenty years imprisonment. Also, if one of the offenses re-
sulted in the conviction of a class B felony,' 7 no more than a thirty
year sentence could be imposed.' 8 Under this law, no matter how
13. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10 (McKinney 1975) defines "felony" as "an offense for
which a term of imprisonment in excess of one year may be imposed."
14. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.02 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984) classifies violent
felonies as follows:
1. Definition of a violent felony offense. A violent felony offense is a class B
violent felony offense, a class C violent felony offense, a class D violent
felony offense, or a class E violent felony offense, defined as follows:
(a) Class B violent felony offenses: an attempt to commit the class A-1
felonies of murder in the second degree . . . ; kidnapping in the first
degree . . . ; and arson in the first degree . . . ; manslaughter in the first
degree. . . ; rape in the first degree. . . ; sodomy in the first degree...
aggravated sexual abuse . . . ; kidnapping in the second degree . . .
burglary in the first degree. . . ; arson in the second degree. . . ; robbery
in the first degree . . . ; criminal possesion of a dangerous weapon in the
first degree . . . ; criminal use of a firearm in the first degree . . . ; and
aggravated assault upon a peace officer ....
(b) Class C violent felony offenses: an attempt to commit any of the
class B felonies set forth in paragraph (a); assault in the first degree ...
burglary in the second degree . . . ; robbery in the second degree . . .
criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree . . . ; and criminal
use of a firearm in the second degree ....
(c) Class D violent felony offenses: an attempt to commit any of the
class C felonies set forth in paragraph (b); assault in the second degree
; sexual abuse in the first degree . . . ; criminal possession of a
weapon in the third degree . . . ; and criminal sale of a firearm in the first
degree ....
(d) Class E violent felony offenses: an attempt to commit any of the
felonies of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree ....
15. "When one sentence of confinement is to follow another in point of time, the
second sentence is deemed to be consecutive." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (5th ed.
1979). On the other hand, concurrent sentences are "[t]wo or more terms of impris-
onment, all or part of each term of which is served simultaneously and the prisoner is
entitled to discharge at the expiration of the longest term specified."Id. at 264.
16. An indeterminate sentence is "[a] sentence of imprisonment the duration of
which is not fixed by the court but is left to the determination of penal authorities
within minimum and maximum time limits fixed by the court of law." Id. at 694.
This is distinguished from a determinate sentence, which is a sentence "for a fixed
period as specified by statute . Id. at 405.
17. See supra note 10.
18. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.30 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981) reads in part:
1. Indeterminate sentences. An indeterminate sentence of imprisonment
commences when the prisoner is received in an institution under the
jurisdiction of the state department of correctional services. Where a
person is under more than one indeterminate sentence, the sentences shall
be calculated as follows:
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violent or numerous the crimes committed, the defendant would serve
no more than a thirty year sentence.
Various New York. courts 9 and legislators20 contended that this
restriction on sentence length was too short to be effective, especially
in the light of recent egregious incidents. 21 This criticism focuses on
the fact that the restriction allowed a defendant to obtain a "free
ride" 22 because once he is convicted of two violent felonies, the thirty-
year limitation takes effect no matter how many more violent felonies
he may have committed. 23 The court in People v. Mosley 24 hypothe-
(c) The aggregate maximum term of consecutive sentences imposed for
two or more crimes, other than two or more crimes that include a class A
felony, committed prior to the time the person was imprisoned under any
of such sentences shall, if it exceeds twenty years, be deemed to be twenty
years, unless one of the sentences was imposed for a class B felony, in
which case the aggregate maximum term shall, if it exceeds thirty years,
be deemed to be thirty years. Where the aggregate maximum term of two
or more consecutive sentences is reduced by calculation made pursuant to
this paragraph, the aggregate minimum, period of imprisonment, if it
exceeds one-half of the aggregate maximum term as so reduced, shall be
deemed to be one-half of the aggregate maximum term as so reduced.
19. See, e.g., People v. Zimmer, 88 A.D.2d 1031, 1031-32; 452 N.Y.S.2d 705,
705-06 (3d Dep't 1982) (defendant convicted of two counts of rape in first degree and
two counts of coercion in first degree, and sentenced to consecutive terms of impris-
onment to run from minimum of 26 years to total of 52 years; despite severity of
crimes, judge declared sentence illegal and remitted case for resentencing so as to
conform with thirty year restriction). See also People v. Moore, 96 A.D.2d 601, 601;
465 N.YS.2d 293, 294 (2d Dep't 1983)(defendant convicted of first degree rape and
second degree assault, sentences to run consecutively; sentence was reduced, not
declared illegal as in Zimmer, to maximum of thirty years imprisonment to conform
to law, despite heinous acts committed). Cf. People v. Williams, 41 A.D.2d 611, 611;
340 N.Y.S.2d 504, 504 (1st Dep't 1973).
20. See, e.g., 1983 N.Y. Laws 2462, 2463 (Memorandum of Legislative Repre-
sentative of City of New York)(prior law "frustrates the intent of the court in
sentencing a violent [f]elony offender and, even worse, gives the defendants a 'free
ride' for the additional felonies committed ...; [t]his type of sentence reduction is
totally at odds with reasonable attempts to provide a sufficient scope of punishment
for serious, violent offenders"); N.Y. Times, June 4, 1983, at 25, col. 6 (Assemblyman
Arthur J. Kremer from Long Beach, Long Island, stated that, under existing law,
criminals could get "free ride" for committing multiple felony offenses).
21. See infra note 5; 1983 N.Y. Laws 2462 (Memorandum of Legislative Repre-
sentative of City of New York). The memorandum makes note of one incident in
which a predicate felon, one with a prior record of felony arrests, committed an
armed robbery of a store, and kidnapped and raped two female employees. Later, he
again committed an armed robbery and raped two women. Although he was appre-
hended, he will serve no more than an indeterminate term of 15 to 30 years. "In
short, he may be released in as early as 15 years to rob or rape again." Id.
22. 1983 N.Y. Laws 2462, 2463; N.Y. Times, June 4, 1983, at 25, col. 6 (state-
ment of Assemblyman Arthur J. Kremer).
23. See supra note 8.
24. 78 Misc. 2d 736, 358 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Monroe County Ct.), rev'd on other
grounds, 46 A.D.2d 476, 363 N.Y.S.2d 151, aff'd sub nom, People v. Broadie, 37
1984] RETRIBUTION
sized a situation in which a defendant commits rape, arson, robbery,
assault, and murder. The court recognized that despite these serious
and numerous felonies, the existing law restricted the judge to impos-
ing at most a thirty year sentence. 25
Therefore, New York Penal Law section 70.30(1)(c) was amended
to increase the aggregate length of a prison sentence for the multiple
felony offender.2 6 In essence, the amended provision states that the
aggregate maximum term of consecutive sentences imposed for two
violent felony crimes, one of which is a class B felony, will be forty
years; the aggregate maximum term of consecutive sentences imposed
for three or more violent felony crimes, one of which is a class B
felony, will be fifty years. 7 In effect, section 70.30(1)(c)(iii) amounts
to a maximum sentence of nearly life imprisonment when the severest
maximum term is imposed.
Any statute regarding sentencing should be supported by at least
one of the generally accepted rationales of punishment in order to
further the goals of a coherent criminal justice system. Which ratio-
nale or rationales the amended provision subscribes to, and whether
the amended provision fulfills the reasoning behind the rationale, is
subject to inquiry.
N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d 338, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950
(1975) (defendant convicted of criminal sale of controlled substance in third degree).
25. Id. at 741, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 1009.
Indeed, a person can commit any number of Class B felonies. . , and yet
be sentenced to a maximum of only 30 years' imprisonment if the series of
crimes was committed prior to the time the person was imprisoned under
any of the sentences arising out of those crimes . ...
Thus a person who kills intentionally, who causes serious physical injury
in the course of a robbery, who rapes a child, who blows up an occupied
building, faces a maximum term of 25 years, or a maximum of thirty years
for a series of such acts before being imprisoned on any one of them.
Id.
26. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.30(1)(c)(ii)-(iii)(McKinney Supp. 1983):
(ii) Notwithstanding subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, the aggregate maximum
term of consecutive sentences imposed for the conviction of two violent felony
offenses committed prior to the time the person was imprisoned under any of such
sentences and one of which is a class B violent felony offense, shall, if it exceeds forty
years, be deemed to be forty years;
(iii) Notwithstanding subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of this paragraph, the aggregate
maximum term of consecutive sentences imposed for the conviction of three or more
violent felony offenses committed prior to the time the person was imprisoned under
any such sentences and one of which is a class B violent felony offense, shall, if it
exceeds fifty years, be deemed to be fifty years.
27. Id.
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III. Sentencing Rationales
A. Preface and History
The four generally accepted goals for punishing criminal offenders
are deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation and retribution .28 In
determining a proper sentencing strategy, the courts and legislatures
have based their decisions on one or more of these rationales,2 9 not
necessarily preferring one rationale over another.30 Often, decisions
with respect to sentencing will reflect the prevailing opinion in society
regarding the favored rationale for criminal punishment.
The philosophy of criminal law in the United States was originally
brought to the American colonies with the adoption of the English
common law. 31 The early system of criminal justice was founded upon
the concept of retaliation.32 If an offender willingly broke the law, he
28. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974)(Court identified
three functions of correctional system: specific and general deterrence, rehabilita-
tion, and institutional security); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248
(1949)(Court endorsed rehabilitation, and noted retribution as factor to be weighed
when sentencing); United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1201 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1980)(citing Williams v. New York, supra, court evaluated
three factors in fashioning a proper sentence: deterrence, rehabilitation and retribu-
tion); United States v. Carlston, 562 F. Supp. 181, 184-85 (N.D. Cal. 1983)(specific
deterrence, general deterrence, rehabilitation and restraint designated as four pri-
mary sentencing purposes of criminal law); United States v. Akers, 499 F. Supp. 43,
44 (D. Or. 1980)(separation, rehabilitation, deterrence and retribution stated as four
primary purposes of punishment); People v. Notey, 72 A.D.2d 279, 282-83, 423
N.Y.S.2d 947, 950 (2d Dep't 1980)(generally accepted principles of criminal punish-
ment are deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation and isolation).
29. See infra notes 188-210 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Fielding v. LeFevre, 548 F.2d 1102, 1108 (2d Cir. 1977)(no consti-
tutional principle exists that prefers one rationale over another; therefore, lower
court's opinion to punish offender solely for impact of deterrence and retribution is
valid); Castle v. United States, 399 F.2d 642, 652 (5th Cir. 1968)(noting Supreme
Court's decision in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), court commented that
rehabilitation is not the only rationale for punishment and that deterrence is also
valid consideration); People v. Burgh, 89 A.D.2d 672, 672, 453 N.Y.S.2d 783, 785
(3d Dep't 1982) (not only are deterrence and retribution valid considerations, but also
is defendant's rehabilitation; sentencing judge should consider all three factors when
determining sentence); People v. Farrar, 52 N.Y.2d 302, 305-06, 419 N.E.2d 864,
865, 437 N.Y.S.2d 961, 962 (1981)(judge should consider rehabilitation and deter-
rence when fashioning sentence).
31. H. Wechsler, The Model Penal Code and the Codification of American
Criminal Law, in CRIME, CRIMINOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 419 (R. Hood ed. 1975).
32. Richardson, From Retaliation to Rehabilitation to Retribution in Criminal
Punishment, 36 J. MIssouRI BAR 149, 150 (1980). The author states that retaliation,
or lex talionis (the law of the claw), functions according to the principle of the
punishment fitting the crime.
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was punished for his guilty mind and the illegal act. 33 By seeking
revenge for the malicious conduct, society was retaliating against the
offender for the illegal action. Hence, the offense was expiated by the
punishment invoked by the legal system. Retaliation prevailed as the
primary justification for the imposition of criminal sentences in the
United States until the end of the Civil War. 34
During the mid-19th century, the idea of rehabilitation, the con-
cept of re-educating the offender, began superseding retaliation as the
predominant theory of punishment. 35 Some of the reasons cited for
this change included a new understanding of individual rights as
opposed to state sovereignty, a concept arising out of the revolutions
of the 18th century, 36 the movement within the legal system toward
criminal law codification, 37 and the growing acceptance of the science
of psychiatry .38 The theory of rehabilitation promotes the education of
the offender, based on a belief that part of the guilt for the offense
belongs to the economic and social conditions of society.
Between 1880 and 1920, the ideal of rehabilitation changed the
American penal system by introducing probation and parole pro-
grams. 39 By 1922, thirty-eight states had adopted indeterminate sen-
tencing and, by 1976, all states had done so. 40 The rehabilitative
theory also helped to establish the practices of reducing a prison term
33. Id. Atonement for the offense was an eye for an eye; this sense of criminal
justice continued to thrive in society largely due to religious support. Id. "But if any
harm follow, then thou shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for
hand, foot for foot, burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe." 21
Exodus 23-24.
34. See generally, Rothman, "If Prison, How Much?" in JUSTICE IN SENTENCING
46-52 (L. Orland & H. Tyler eds. 1974).
35. Richardson, supra note 32, at 150.
36. Id.
37. David D. Field and Edward Livingston influenced this movement toward
criminal law codification. At the same time, Ireland and Australia were transform-
ing their prison systems from retaliatory in nature to rehabilitative, which also had
an influence in the United States. See L. ORLAND, PRISONS: HOUSES OF DARKNESS 29-
33 (1975).
38. Richarson, supra note 32, at 150.
39. The first indeterminate sentencing legislation was proposed in New York in
1876. The legislation provided for no set minimum or maximum terms whatsoever,
education of the offenders, and "conditional liberation." The New York Legislature,
however, did require that minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment be estab-
lished. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, DEFINITE SENTENCING: AN EXAMINATION OF
PROPOSALS IN FouR STATES 5 (1976).
40. Id. See also Orland, From Vengeance to Vengeance: Sentencing Reform and
the Demise of Rehabilitation, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 29, 30-31 (1978).
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for good behavior and of instituting maximum-minimum sentencing
guidelines .41
The rehabilitative ideal was first challenged in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. 42 Various studies and treatises were published questioning
the validity and effectiveness of rehabilitation. 43 Generally, the criti-
cisms focused on the issues of sentencing disparity for similiar crimes ,'44
the courts' and parole boards' inability to accurately predict future
conduct by the offender, 45 and the fact that, in general, rehabilitation
had not been proven to be sufficiently effective. 46
As a result, another shift has occurred in the primary philosophy
behind criminal sentencing, not only because of the disenchantment
with rehabilitation, but also because of the the high crime rates and
the "get-tough" law-and-order policy of the late 1970s and 1980s. 47
Authorities have referred to this new concept as "justice," "retribu-
tion" or "just deserts. '48 Other criminal justice theorists, however,
believe that this concept is a step back to retaliation. 4 Nevertheless,
41. Richardson, supra note 32, at 150-51; COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
supra note 39, at 5.
42. See generally, AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971);
FRANKEL, supra note 8; N. Moms, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1976); G.R.
NEWMAN, THE PUNISHMENT RESPONSE (1978); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); E. VAN DEN
HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975) A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976); J.Q.
WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975); Note, Aversion Therapy: Its Limited Poten-
tial for Use in the Correctional Setting, 26 STANFORD L. REV. 1237 (1974).
43. See, e.g., D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON, & J. WILKS, EFFECTIVENESS OF CORREC-
TIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975); Martin-
son, What Works-Questions and Answers about Prison Reform, 35 THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 22 (1974); Robinson & Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional Programs,
17 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 67 (1971). See also infra notes 129-47 and accompanying
text.
44. See, e.g., J. GORECKI, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1979); P. O'DONNELL,
M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM (1977).
See also Golding, Criminal Sentencing: Some Philosophical Considerations, in JUS-
TICE AND PUNISHMENT 89 (J. Cederblom & W. Blizek eds. 1977), in which the author
cites Edward Levi, former Attorney General of the United States, as commenting
that sentencing "has the attributes of a lottery"(N.Y. Post, May 5, 1976, at 13, col. 1)
due to the disparity in decisions of whether to imprison or to place on probation. Id.
at 92. See also infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., CITIZENS INQUIRY ON PAROLE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PRISON WITH-
OUT WALLS: A REPORT ON NEW YORK PAROLE (1975); Dershowitz, The Law of
Dangerousness: Some Fictions about Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24 (1970). See
also infra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 43.
47. Richardson, supra note 32, at 151.
48. See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 42; O'DONNELL, CHURGIN & CURTIS, supra note
44; VON HIRSCH, supra note 42.
49. Orland, supra note 40, at 33 ("[t]he new code word was 'just deserts,' rather
than the theretofore discredited terms 'punishment,' 'vengeance,' or 'retribution.' ");
904 [Vol. XII
RETRIBUTION
this trend has prompted many states to abandon or modify the inde-
terminate sentencing system 5 in order to avoid the problems stem-
ming from the rehabilitative theory. Retribution seeks to impose a
punishment proportionate to the offense committed to prevent the
offender from profiting from his crime. The theory promotes punish-
ment for the sake of justice, and justice is served when the sentence is
proportionate to the crime. Appropriate sentences result in fairness to
both the offender and society.
In order to understand the relationship between a sentencing stat-
ute, the rationales of punishment and the impetus underlying the
amended provision, a closer examination of deterrence, incapacita-
tion, rehabilitation and retribution is required. Although each ratio-
nale is separate and distinct in character and effect, often a variety of
rationales may be relied upon through the imposition of a single
sentence or sentencing statute. 51 Courts have stated that enunciating
reasons for sentencing an offender is proper,52 and some have even
suggested that such commentary should be required, not only to
provide for a sound response to the offender's conduct, but also for
reasons relating to possible appellate review. 53
B. Deterrence
The deterrence theory is predicated upon the principle that punish-
ment prevents people from breaking laws because the pain of impris-
onment, a criminal sanction, will outweigh an individual's desire to
engage in criminal activity. 54 Many theorists believe that deterrence is
Richardson, supra note 32, at 151 (once rehabilitation came under attack, legal
reformers turned to older theories of punishment and renamed retaliation, -retribu-
tion"). But see infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-101 to -121 (Special Supp. 1978):
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170-.6 (West Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 947.165, .172,
.174 (West 1983 Supp.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-3-1 to -10-2 (Smith-Hurd
1982); IND. CODE ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 35-50-1-1 to -6-6 (1979); 1978 N.Y. LAWS 848.
51. See infra notes 188-210.
52. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-50 (1949); Torres v. United
States, 564 F.2d 617, 619 (1st Cir. 1977); Moore v. United States, 571 F.2d 179, 181-
82 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522, 527-28 (1st. Cir. 1974).
53. See United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1130 (3d Cir. 1977), McGee v.
United States, 462 F.2d 243, 246-47 (2d Cir. 1972).
54. For a general introduction to the principles of deterrence, see, e.g., F.
ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973):
Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949
(1966); Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW 523 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds. 1975).
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the sole purpose of the criminal law. 55 The general aim of deterrence
is to reduce the crimerate through the threat 56 or use of5r punishment.
The deterrence theory therefore has been termed "forward-looking" 58
in that the effect of the rationale is geared toward the regulation of
future acts. 59
There are two categories of deterrence: specific and general. 0 The
theory underlying specific deterrence is that the imposition of punish-
ment on an offender will discourage him from engaging in subsequent
criminal conduct. 6 1 The goal of general deterrence is to punish the
specific offender in order to discourage others in society from engag-
ing in criminal behavior.6 2
55. Collins v. Brown, 268 F. Supp. 198, 201 (D.D.C. 1967).
The purpose of punishment, be it a criminal sentence, a civil penalty, or
punitive damages, is not to inflict suffering or to impose a loss on the
offender. Its object is to act as a deterrent: first to discourage the offender
himself from repeating his transgression; and, second, to deter others from
doing likewise.
Id. See, e.g., O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 42-43, 46 (1923); TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, supra note 42, at 69-71;
Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 627, 631 (1966)("[i]f
punishment 'cannot deter, then we might as well scrap the whole of our criminal
law' ")(quoting Goodhart, Book Review, 74 THE LISTENER 1006 (1965)); van den
Haag, Punitive Sentences, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 123, 123 (1978).
56. "The law threatens certain pains if you do certain things, intending thereby
to give you a new motive for not doing them. If you persist in doing them, it has to
inflict the pains in order that its threats may continue to be believed." HOLMES, supra
note 55, at 46. See also J. KREss, PRESCRIPTION FOR JUSTICE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES 230 (1980) (deterrence theory operates on "psychometric
calculation of a 'threat' threshold sufficient to reduce the antisocial behavior of
specific offenders"); G. MUELLER, SENTENCING: PROCESS AND PURI'oSE 48 (1977) ("[t]he
term deterrence seems to refer to the employment of terror as such a stimulus")
(emphasis in original); VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 42, at 51, 60-61; VON HIRSCH,
supra note 42, at 38; Golding, supra note 44, at 95-96.
57. See infra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
58. M. GOLDING, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 72 (1975).
59. GOLDING supra note 58, at 72-73; Hospers, Punishment, Protection, and
Retaliation, in JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT 21 (J. Cederblom & W. Blizek eds. 1977)
"Punishment here is not because a crime has been committed and the offender
deserves to be punished for it; the punishment is in order to promote good (and/or
prevent evil) in the future . I.. ." d. at 25 (emphasis in original).
60. See, e.g., GOLDING, supra note 58, at 73-74 (author refers to specific deter-
rence as "particular deterrence"); KRESS, supra note 56, at 230-31; O'DONNELL,
CHURGIN & CURTIS, supra note 44, at 45; R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS 12 (1979); S. VAN
DINE, J. CONRAD & S. DINITZ, RESTRAINING THE WICKED 10-11 (1979); cf. Hospers,
supra note 59, at 25, 26.
61. J. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 34-35 (1975); ZIMRING &
HAWKINS, supra note 54, at 224-29.
62. United States v. Gonzalez, 388 F. Supp. 892, 896 (D. Or. 1974)(general
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Both deterrence theories operate on the premise that members of
society tend to anticipate the consequences of their actions .63 How-
ever, this rationale does not apply to "crimes of passion;" that is,
crimes committed with emotions which render the individual incapa-
ble of "cool reflection."' 4 A crime of passion is committed without
consideration of possible consequences and, therefore, the amount of
threatened or actual punishment will not have any effect on the
offender's actions.65 For example, since most homicides are crimes of
passion, the deterrent effect of punishment is relatively insignificant. 66
Deterrence is more likely to be an effective factor, however, in crimes
such as burglary and kidnapping, where the potential offender has the
opportunity to consider the possible consequences of his actions.6 7
An argument against the deterrence theory is that deterrence re-
quires society to "use" an individual merely as a means to an end-the
deterrence is most controversial of all theories of punishment; "[t]he question here is
whether punishment of these defendants, in this court, on these charges will, if well-
publicized, deter others in this state... "; "[e]ven though few may be charged and
convicted, many will understand that if caught, they face stiff sentences") (emphasis
in original); People v. Corapi, 42 Misc, 2d 247, 250, 247 N.Y.S.2d 609, 612 (Sup. Ct.
Albany County 1964)(quoting Judge Cardozo in his essay Law and Literature in
SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 379 (1947)(Address before New
York Academy of Medicine, Nov. 1, 1928):
Punishment is necessary, indeed, not only to deter the man who is a
criminal at heart, who has felt the criminal impulse, who is on the brink of
indecision, but also to deter others who in our existing social organization
have never felt the criminal impulse and shrink from crime in horror.
Id. See also sources cited, supra note 61; ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 54, at 38-
39.
63. See Erlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Enforcement, 24 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 259, 267-69 (1972); Hospers, supra note 59, at 25-26.
64. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531 (1968); United States v. Collins, 690
F.2d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1982); United States ex rel. Torres v. Mancusi, 427 F.2d 168,
169 (2d Cir. 1970); Carter v. Gray, 575 F. Supp. 190, 196 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Cape v.
Francis, 588 F. Supp. 1207, 1219-20 (M.D. Georgia 1983); United States v. Dangler,
556 F. Supp. 195, 198 (N.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Mays, 470 F. Supp. 642,
647 (S.D. Tex. 1979); United States v. Paterno, 375 F. Supp. 647, 649 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
65. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
66. Hospers, supra note 59, at 25-26.
67. MoRmis, supra note 42, at 58-84; MUELLER, supra note 56, at 51. See also
Dangler, 556 F. Supp. at 197-98. In this case, the court referred to the relationship
between sentencing and the degree of criminal intent involved. "Certainly the crimi-
nal intent involved in a coldly calculated series of acts designed to make money for
the criminal with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law is far higher
than that involved in a momentary crime of passion or a crime of opportunity,
sudden and overwhelmingly tempting." Id. at 198.
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reduction of the crime rate. 6 Deterrence opponents object to the
sentencing of an offender to imprisonment in order to make him an
example to others so that they will not engage in similiar unlawful
conduct. These opponents would argue that an individual should not
be used for this purpose.6 9 Nevertheless, advocates of the deterrence
theory believe that the "use" of an offender is justified because the
offender who has broken the law has forfeited his right not to be
"used." Proponents of the deterrence rationale also maintain that this
"use" promotes the greater good of lower crime rates and ultimately
establishes a law abiding society. 70 In this regard, the interests of
society outweigh the interests of the offender.
A corollary to the opponent's argument is that deterrence can be
achieved unjustly by punishing anyone guilty or innocent with a
disproportionally severe sentence. 71 For deterrence to be successful,
the important concern is what the public believes the person did, not
necessarily what he actually did. 72 Therefore, actual guilt or inno-
cence is irrelevant. In addition, attaching disproportionally severe
sentences to any offense would deter criminal activity (e.g., a twenty
year prison sentence for a parking violation).73 However, the response
from the deterrence theory advocates is that such an abuse of this
theory would result only in outrage, indignity, loss of respect for the
criminal justice system,7 4 and juries not convicting offenders who
would receive disproportionate sentences. The logical foundation
upon which the deterrence theory rests would not support either
punishment of innocent persons or imposition of disproportionate
sentences .7
Opponents of the deterrence theory argue that the mere threat of a
prison sentence does not deter illegal conduct, citing not only high
68. GOLDING, supra note 58, at 74, 75; SINGER, supra note 60, at 14-15; Ezorsky,
Ethics of Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT XV-XVii (G.
Ezorsky ed. 1972).
69. See KREss, supra note 56, at 231.
70. See GOLDING, supra note 58, at 74-75; KRESs, supra note 56, at 231; SINGER,
supra note 60, at 14-15; Ezorsky, supra note 68, at 330-33.
71. See GOLDING supra note 58, at 75, 79-83 (author discusses view that deter-
rence justifies punishment of the innocent).
72. Puglsey, supra note 9, at 393.
73. GOLDING, supra note 58, at 76-79; Golding, supra note 44, at 96-98.
74. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 11-13 (1968); An-
denaes, The Morality of Deterrence, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 649, 651-55 (1970).
75. Pugsley, supra note 9, at 393.
[Vol. XII
RETRIBUTION
recidivist rates, 7 but also the fact that offenders currently awaiting
sentencing were not deterred by the threat of punishment. 77 However,
proponents argue that the threat of punishment may have deterred a
specific offender from committing more serious offenses, 7 and that
crime statistics do not reflect the number of citizens who avoid crimi-
nal behavior because of the deterrent effect of the sanction. Such
statistics, they contend, merely indicate those instances when the
deterrent effect of anticipation was ineffective. 7 What remains un-
known, however, is whether the offender acted despite the potential
consequences of his action or because he was not fully aware of his
fate once apprehended.
For general deterrence to be effective, the public must be aware of
an action's threatened sanction. 0 For this goal to be achieved, an
evaluation of the means and degree of public dissemination regarding
sentencing information is required."' Deterrence, however, has not
achieved ideal results because public awareness of crimes is most
frequently focused upon sensational trials and not on the mundane
offense and punishments.
Courts that have relied upon the deterrence theory for sentencing
also consider the seriousness and nature of the crime involved. For
example, in United States v. Brubaker,2 the defendant was convicted
76. See GOLDING, supra note 58, at 72; VON HIRSCH, supra note 42, at 38-39;
Golding, supra note 44, at 73.
77. VON HIRSCH, supra note 42, at 38-39.
78. Id.; GOLDING, supra note 58, at 72.
79. VON HIRSCH, supra note 42, at 38-39."[R]ecidivism among convicted offend-
ers shows only that they have not been deterred, and indicates nothing about the
effect of their punishment on the rest of the population. In the absence of any
punishment, a much larger number of persons-who now refrain-might have
committed crimes." Id. at 38-39.
80. United States v. Carlston, 562 F. Supp. 181, 185 (N.D. Cal. 1983)("[b]y
publication of the trial, conviction and punishment, the public will be educated as to
the proper distinction between good and bad"); MUELLER, supra note 56, at 48; Note,
An Introduction to the Theory, Justifications and Manifestations of Criminal Punish-
ment, 27 McGILL L.J. 73, 76 (1981).
81. See, e.g., J.M. BURNS & J.S. MATTINA, SENTENCING 3 (1978); GOLDING, supra
note 58, at 96.
The public is not very well informed on the sentences that are meted out,
yet the general deterrence value of punishment is dependent on the public-
ity it gets. What the public hears about is a few horrendous crimes and a
few sensational trials. Perhaps the state should take out newspaper adver-
tisements giving the names of convicted offenders, the type of offense, and
the sentence received.
KaEss, supra note 56, at 231 ("[t]he study of effectiveness measures, improved infor-
mation systems, and the public dissemination of sentencing information is called for,
while the changing incidents of crime in the community-and public and press
commentary concerning it-are legitimate concerns for the sentencing judge").
82. 663 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1981).
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of two counts of embezzlement and one count of income tax evasion.
He was sentenced to two consecutive five-year sentences for the em-
bezzlement conviction and a concurrent three-year sentence for the
income tax evasion. The lower court had justified the sentence be-
cause of the "consciously illegal" nature of the defendant's actions and
the severity of the offense.8 3 The court stated that, "where there has
been an individualized determination, it is proper for a sentencing
court to place greater emphasis upon deterrence than other goals of
criminal justice. 8 4
Despite the problems associated with the deterrence rationale, it is
still a critical consideration in sentencing policy decisions. Deterrence
is based on a "forward looking," common sense approach, and "it is
still a fundamental fact of social life that the risk of unpleasant conse-
quences is a very strong motivational factor for most people in most
situations. 85
C. Incapacitation
Incapacitation or "neutralization"86 involves removing the offender
from society, thus rendering him incapable of committing further
criminal acts.8 7 The practical effect of incapacitation is the reduction
of the crime rate by physically preventing the offender from endan-
gering society.8 8 Incapacitation is generally appropriate in situations
where the defendant poses a substantial risk to society. The rationale
assumes that the offenses committed are so severe and the chance of
repetition so great that the judge incapacitates the offender for the
purpose of protecting society."
Incapacitation can take many forms, including exile, house arrest,
military service, banishment, deportation and incarceration. 0 Incar-
83. Id. at 769.
84. Id. at 770. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court,
stating that considerations of deterrence are valid because people contemplating or
who have contemplated committing crimes may refrain from such activity if they
knew, based on other's experiences that not only would civil respect be lost, but also
that a substantial term of imprisonment would be imposed. Id. at 770.
85. Andenaes, supra note 74, at 664.
86. MUELLER, supra note 56, at 53-55. The terms are used interchangeably.'
87. See KRESS, supra note 56, at 230; McKay, It's Time to Rehabilitate the
Sentencing Process, 60 JUDICATURE 223, 226 (1976); National Academy of Sciences
Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects, Measuring Deterrence
and Incapacitation, in SENTENCING 228 (H. Gross & A. von Hirsch eds. 1981).
88. KRESS, supra note 56, at 230.
89. Id.
90. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING, supra note 42, at 70.
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ceration is the primary means of incapacitating in the United States.9 '
The incapacitation of an offender does not require the infliction of
pain other than that inherent in the incapacitation itself. Although
suffering and loss of freedom occur as a result of incapacitation,
theoretically, these factors are considered to be unintended side ef-
fects. 2 Incapacitation recognizes that incarceration is a severe pen-
alty, and that the loss of liberty is itself a grave punishment. 93
Each of the several sentencing rationales discussed recognize socie-
ty's right and obligation to incapacitate dangerous criminals in order
to protect society.9 4 Incapacitation should, however, be used only to
the extent necessary to attain its preventive purpose. 5 In addition, the
incapacitation should last only as long as the offender poses a danger
to society.9 6
A narrower concept of the incapacitation theory is "predictive re-
straint," which incapacitates offenders based on a prediction of their
criminal propensities.9 7 The theory behind predictive restraint is that
if the offender is considered likely to commit another crime in the
future, then he should be currently incapacitated in order to protect
society.9 8 This doctrine is supported by both the Model Penal Code°9
91. Incarceration has been defined as
collective residential restraint. By restraint we mean that the individual is
restricted to a narrowly circumscribed place . . . . By residential we mean
that the place is, for a specified period, the individual's principle abode.
. . . By collective we mean that the person must live in the immediate
company of others, not members of his family or persons of his own
choosing.
VON HIRSCH, supra note 42, at 107-08 (emphasis in original).
92. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE, supra note 42, at 70.
93. VON HIRSCH, supra note 42, at 109.
94. See, e.g., MUELLER, supra note 56, at 54.
95.
Even among the staunchest advocates of a so-called non-punitive system,
society's right and obligation to incarcerate dangerous offenders is gener-
ally conceded. Naturally, the principle of utility would dictate that, solely
as far as neutralization is concerned, no more force should be employed
than is necessary ....
MUELLER, note 56, at 54.
96. Id.
97. See R. DAWSON, SENTENCING 80 (1969); GOLDING, supra note 58, at 101-02;
VON HIRSCH, supra note 42, at 19-26; Cohen, Incapacitative Effect of Imprisonment:
Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates, in SANCTIONS, SEN-
TENCING, AND CORRECTIONS 23-25 (N. Kittrie & E. Zenoff eds. 1981)(author distin-
guishes between collective incapacitation and selective incapacitation, a term used as
an analogue to predictive restraint).
98. See generally GOLDING, supra note 58, at 101-02; VON HIRSCH, supra note 42,
at 19-26; Cohen, supra note 97, 23-25.
99. MODEL PENAL CODE 106 (Proposed Draft 1962).
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and the Model Sentencing Act. 100 The Model Penal Code states that an
offender may be confined if the sentencing judge determines that
during a suspended sentence or probation, there is a risk that he is
likely to violate the law. 101 The Model Sentencing Act relies on this
forecasting of criminal activity when deciding which convicted of-
fenders are to be imprisoned and for how long, stating that the danger
the offender poses to society is the prime reason for his incapacita-
tion. 102
The basic flaw in the theory of predictive restraint is the inability to
sufficiently predict recidivist activity. Predictive restraint places a
large amount of discretion with those entrusted to evaluate an offend-
er's character. 0 3 Accurately predicting future criminal behavior is
exceedingly difficult. Those empowered to make the predictions-
judges, psychiatrists and correctional officers-rarely check the accu-
racy of their decisions in order to learn from their mistakes. 0 4 A
problem of "overprediction"' 05 or "false positives"'106 also exists. Over-
prediction occurs when the judge mistakenly classifies the offender as
a recidivist. This mistaken classification has the most severe conse-
quences for the non-recidivist offender, who faces an extended loss of
liberty. 107 An element of incapacitation is the belief that the depriva-
tion of liberty is the severest penalty and that incapacitation should
last only as long as the offender poses a danger to society. '08 Overpre-
diction results in an injustice to the offender and an abuse of the
rationale itself.
100. COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELIQUENCY,
MODEL SENTENCING AcT (2d ed. 1972)(hereinafter MODEL SENTENCING ACT).
101. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 99, § 7.01(1)(a).
102. MODEL SENTENCING ACT, supra note 100, §§ 1, 5, 9.
103. Pugsley, supra note 9, at 389. For a general discussion regarding the inaccur-
acies of predicting future criminality, see MORRIS, supra note 42, at 58-84; VON
HIRSCH, supra note 42, at 19-26; Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some
Fictions about Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24 (1971); von Hirsch, Predictions of
Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L.
REV. 717 (1972).
104. Dershowitz, supra note 103, at 46.
105. VON HIRSCH, supra note 42, at 21-22.
106. Id. KnsS, supra note 56, at 230; MoRms, supra note 42, at 62-73. See
generally Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical
Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1979).
107. VON HIRSCH, supra note 42, at 22. "The offender's confinement might have
to be lengthy, if the aim is to prevent the offender from offending again. He would
have to be held until his predicted criminal tendencies abated-which might take
years . I..." d.
108. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
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Various studies'09 have concluded that the methods of forecasting
criminal behavior, clinically or statistically, are not reliable. The
expert must base his forecast upon the relationship between the de-
fendant's current characteristics and his subsequent criminal behav-
ior, since only grossly observable characteristics of the criminal popu-
lation can be identified.110 The use of predictive restraint to
incapacitate the offender is too uncertain to justify a satisfactory form
of punishment. The idea of structuring a criminal justice system on
arbitrary predictive factors is difficult to accept. "[W]hatever addi-
tional safety benefits might be gained ...on the basis of statistical
factors .. simply are not worth the price of bringing into the crimi-
nal justice system an element of blatant injustice to individuals.""'
D. Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation has been the favored and primary purpose of sen-
tencing criminals in the United States for the last one hundred and
fifty years. 1 2 This rationale
is part of a humanistic tradition which, in pressing for ever more
individualization of justice, has demanded that we treat the crimi-
109. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
110. VON HIRsCH, supra note 42, at 22. See also Wenk & Enrich, Youth: An
Exploratory Study of the Assaultive Experience and Assaultive Potential of California
Youth Authority Wards, 9 J. RESEARCH IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 171,190-96 (1972).
111. Plattner, The Rehabilitation of Punishment, 43 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 104,
114 (1976).
-112. Pugsley, supra note 9, at 383. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823
(1974)("since most offenders will eventually return to society, another paramount
objective of the corrections system is the rehabilitation of those committed to its
custody"); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (reformation and rehabil-
itation are important goals of criminal justice system); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d
44, 48 n.2 (4th Cir. 1977)(rehabilitation, premised on notion of educating offenders
to become useful and productive members of society, is one of primary purposes of
criminal justice even though it is not constitutionally mandated; right to treatment
stems from eighth amendment and must be viewed in light of "the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society") (quoting Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)); Benson v. United States, 332 F.2d 288, 292 (5th Cir.
1964)("[a]ll recognize that one of the most important functions to be performed by
criminal law and its integral component, the prison system, is rehabilitation of the
offender"); People ex rel. Ceschini v. Warden, 30 A.D.2d 649, 649; 291 N.Y.S.2d
200, 202 (1st Dep't 1968) (primary purpose of imprisonment is rehabilitation, not
punishment); People v. Mosley, 78 Misc. 2d 736, 740; 358 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1008
(Monroe County Ct. 1974)(major objective in criminal punishment is rehabilitation
of offender); People ex rel. Carter v. Warden of New York City Reformatory, 62
Misc. 2d 191, 193; 308 N.Y.S.2d 552, 555 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1970).
The philosophy justifying confinement in a penal institution is rehabilita-
tion and not punitive vengeance. The American system of penology af-
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nal, not the crime. It relies on a medical and educative model,
defining the criminal as, if not sick, less than evil; somehow less
"responsible" than he had previously been regarded. As a kind of
social malfunctioner, the criminal needs to be "treated" or to be
reeducated, reformed, or rehabilitated. Rehabilitation is, in many
ways, the opposite of punishment. It pleads for a non-moral ap-
proach. At the same time, incarceration, as distinguished from
more historic forms of punishment, allows the possibility, at least
theoretically, of both punishment and education occurring simulta-
neously. 113
The theory of rehabilitation, or "resocialization," 14 was a rejection
of the retaliatory forms of punishment, 115 which generally employed
prison sentences and was condemned for encompassing vengeance." 61
A cornerstone of the rehabilitative ideal is the belief that, instead of
punishing, the criminal justice system should educate. "7 The rehabili-
tation occurs through the imposition of a sentence which allows for
the treatment of the particular offender's "social malfunction"
through such means as vocational training, psychiatric therapy, and
electrical and chemical modification."" The doctrine seeks to bring
about changes in the offender's character so that he will be able to act
fords a more valid and profound significance than the exaction by society
of a pound of flesh on repayment for commission of crime. . . . Under any
circumstances, it is abhorrent to cage a human being and bring his life to a
useless, non productive, and deteriorating standstill while the clock ticks
on. It is a complete waste of man's most precious and coveted commod-
ity-time. Accordingly, we are constrained hopefully to provide a con-
structive and meaningful rehabilitative program while he is incarcerated,
until a more effective alternative is found which will successfully stimulate
motivation to change from a potential hostile, aggressive, and professional
criminal career.
Id. at 555. See also, MUELLER, supra note 56, at 55 ("I know of no American
criminologist or lawyer who does not subscribe to resocialization or rehabilitation as
a foremost aim of our correctional approach"); Mueller, Punishment, Corrections,
and the Law, in THE TASKS OF PENOLOGY 47, 69-72 (H. Perlman & T. Allington eds.
1969) ("[a] correctional system must start with the proposition that everybody placed
within its jurisdiction, i.e., every convict, is a fit individual for rehabilitation").
113. VON HIRSCH, supra note 42, at xxix.
114. MUELLER, supra note 56, at 55.
115. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE, supra note 42, at 83-100.
116. Id.
117. See generally K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1966); J. MITFORD,
KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT (1973); ROTHMAN, THE DIscovERY OF THE ASYLUM,
supra note 34; Menninger & Menninger, The Senselessness of Sentencing, 14
WASHBURN L. J. 241 (1975).
118. See, e.g., A. CAMPBELL, THE LAW OF SENTENCING 34 (1978).
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in a law-abiding manner upon release." 9 Successful rehabilitation
requires that each offender be treated separately in order that each
individual sentence will promote that specific individual's reform.12 0
The rehabilitative theory is supported by the Model Penal Code' 21
and the Model Sentencing Act. 22 The Model Penal Code allows for
the consideration of rehabilitation in a correctional institution if the
sentencer is of the opinion that such action will result in the protection
of society. 2 3 The Model Sentencing Act states that criminal rehabilita-
tion is sentencing's primary purpose and that treatment for the of-
fender should last only as long as required to bring about his rehabili-
tation. 2 4 The Act also maintains that in dealing with an offender's
rehabilitation, individual characteristics and circumstances must be
considered.1 25 Advocates of the rehabilitative theory argue that this
justification provides a civilized society with a means to lower the
crime rate, to deal with the offenders themselves, and to improve
society at large. 2 6 A sentence designed specifically to fit the offender,
subjecting him to an individualized program, theoretically will reduce
one's willingness to engage in subsequent criminal activity while pro-
viding him with the motivation, skills and treatment required to make
him a contributing member of society. 27 The proponents of this the-
ory also argue that, since the recidivist rate is high, it is apparent that
119. See generally supra note 117 and accompanying text.
120. See MENNINGER, supra note 117, at 4-10; E. VAN DEN HAAG & J. CONRAD, THE
DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE 53 (1983); Golding, supra note 44, at 92; Menninger &
Menninger, supra note 117, at 242-43.
121. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 99.
122. MODEL SENTENCING ACT, supra note 100.
123. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 99, § 7.01(b).
124. MODEL SENTENCING ACT, supra note 100, art. 1 § 1.
125. Id.
126. Campbell, supra note 118, at 36; Harris, Disquisition on the Need for a New
Model for Criminal Sanctioning System, 77 W. VA. L. R. 263, 280 (1975).
127. See, e.g., infra note 117 and accompanying text; United States v. Foss, 501
F.2d 522, 528 (1st Cir. 1974)(sentencing judge must consider "individualizing" sen-
tence to offender so as to provide for offender's rehabilitation); Verdugo v. United
States, 402 F.2d 599, 611 (9th Cir. 1968)("[t]here is undoubtedly a strong public
interest in the imposition of a proper sentence-one based upon an accurate evalua-
tion of the particular offender and designed to aid in his personal rehabilitation");
People v. Jacobsohn, 60 A.D.2d 607, 608-09; 400 N.Y.S.2d 136, 139 (2d Dep't
1977)(sentence must be condemnatory and evaluate offender's possibilites for rehabil-
itation); People v. Cerio, 34 A.D.2d 1095, 1096, 312 N.Y.S.2d 596, 597 (4th Dep't
1970)("[i]mprisonment, therefore, should be meted out with a view to the rehabilita-
tion of the defendant as a useful and responsible member of the community")(quot-
ing People v. Silver, 10 A.D.2d 274, 276, 199 N.Y.S.2d 254, 256 (1st Dep't 1960)).
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no sentencing rationale works effectively and that the only way to
curtail criminal offenses therefore is to reform the criminal of-
fender. 1 28
One of the major criticisms of the rehabilitative system is that
different sentences are sometimes imposed on different offenders for
the commission of the same or equivalent offenses. Specifically, sen-
tencing disparity under the rehabilitative theory exists not only in
length and severity, but also in decisions concerning whether to im-
prison an individual or to place him on probation. 29 This disparity is
often perceived as fundamentally unfair. 30
Professor van den Haag mentions another problem regarding the
rehabilitative theory. He states that if rehabilitation is given priority
over the other rationales of punishment, justice and punishment
themselves become irrelevant.1 3'
Once the criminal is thought [of] as a sick person in need of
treatment, his crime as a symptom of sickness, he does not deserve
punishment. Disease is no crime, and treatment or cure is not
justice according to what is deserved. Treatment for crime can only
be effective or not. It can neither be just nor unjust .... For the
strict rehabilitationist, the notion of crime is as irrelevant as the
notion of justice or punishment. All he sees is a person in need of
treatment. 132
Other criticisms of the rehabilitative rationale include the argu-
ment that this justification for sentencing removes the judge from the
sentencing process and places too much discretion in the hands of the
behavioral scientists and criminal justice experts who "want a blank
check, enabling them to write in their experiments in personality
transformation."' 33 Removing the judge from the sentencing process
divorces from it the concept of punishment, and provides a freedom
from "irksome legal controls" in treating offenders.134 One authority
has referred to this concept as "lawless sentencing" which so far has
128. CAMPBELL, supra note 118, at 36-38.
129' See GoREucKI, supra note 44, at 44-55, 74-81 (1979); VON HIRSCH, supra note
42, at 12
("[filf one of two convicted burglars is thought likely to respond to community-based
treatment while the other seems more amenable to a prison based program, that
would be reason for putting one on probation and imprisoning the other"); Golding,
supra note 44, at 92; Hospers, supra note 59, at 26.
130. Golding, supra note 44, at 92.
131. VAN DEN HAAG & CONRAD, supra note 120, at 54.
132. id.
133. Pugsley, supra note 9, at 386.
134. AMERiCAN FRIENDS SFsV. CoMm., supra note 42, at 39.
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produced "more cruelty and injustice than the benefits its supporters
envisage[d] ."135 However, proponents argue that the behavioral scien-
tists are better able to decide the length of time required for treatment
of the offender than the sentencing judge. 136
The most significant criticism of rehabilitation, however, is that no
method has been proven fully effective. Starting in the late 1960s and
1970s,137 studies and treatises were published discussing the effect
rehabilitative measures had on reducing the rate of recidivism. 138 In
comparing offenders subjected to rehabilitative programs with those
not subjected to such programs, the studies found no significant statis-
tical difference in subsequent criminal activity upon release. 39 The
Committee for the Study of Incarceration, 140 reported in 1976 that
few successes have been found in rehabilitative attempts. 141 For exam-
ple, the Committee's studies indicate that intensive supervision of the
released offender has no effect in reducing subsequent criminal behav-
ior,142 and that, although probation is regarded by rehabilitationists as
a crucial component of the theory, recidivist rates among those on
probation compared to those confined and then released are not sub-
stantially different. 43 These studies, along with others,' 44 indicate
135. FRANKEL, supra note 8, at 88.
136. GorEcyi, supra note 44, at 47; MITFORD, supra note 117, at 80.
The idea is to remove the sentencing power from a . . . trial judge and
place it in the hands of skilled experts in human behavior. These experts
would look at the man rather than his crime, take into account all circum-
stances that may have driven him to break the law, keep close track of his
progress in prison, and release him when he has demonstrated by his
behavior that he is ready to return to the community.
id. MUELLER, supra note 56, at 56.
137. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 42-43.
139. See VAN DEN HAAG & CONRAD, supra note 120, at 53-54; VON HIRSCH, supra
note 42, at 14.
140. VON HIRSCH, supra note 42, at 14.
141. Id. at 152-53. The studies relied on by the Committee for the Study of
Incarceration were prepared by David Greenberg and are presented in Greenberg,
Much Ado About Little: The Correctional Effects of Corrections, Dep't of Sociology,
New York Univ., June, 1974.
142. VON HIRSCH, supra note 42, at 14.
143. VON HIRSCH, supra note 42, at 14; Martinson, supra note 43, at 40-41;
Robison & Smith, supra note 43, at 68-70.
144. See generally R. HOOD & R. SPARKS, KEY ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY (1970); I.
KAUFMAN, PRISONS: THE JUDGE'S DILEMMA (1973); D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & R.
SPARKS, KEY ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY (1970); L.T. WILKINS, EVALUATION OF PENAL
MEASURES (1969); Bailey, Correctional Outcome: An Evaluation of 100 Reports, 57 J.
OF CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 153 (1966); Cole & Talarico, Second Thoughts on
Parole, 63 A.B.A.J. 972 (1977).
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that the rate of recidivism seems to be unaffected by the variety of
rehabilitative programs, and that at best the concept of rehabilitation
remains an ideal. 145 However, recent studies have added to the confu-
sion regarding the rehabilitative theory. 14 This research has shown
some success in rehabilitative methods and has shown some flaws in
previous studies; for example, some researchers argue that the high
recidivist rate is not because of the lack of programs, but because of
the lack of useful job training and job placement for ex-convicts.1 47
Courts, however, have been sympathetic to the individual needs of
the offender in a variety of instances. An offender's individual charac-
teristics and circumstances sometimes influence the court's opinion as
to the appropriate sentence for the offender. In United States v.
Gigax,14s the defendant was convicted of willfully making false and
fraudulent statements on his income tax return. The court noted that
in determining the sentence to be imposed, the judge must consider
each defendant, examining all mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances "with an eye toward reformation and rehabilitation. ' 149 Simi-
liarly, in United States v. Lopez-Gonzales,150 the defendant was con-
victed of illegal entry and a maximum sentence was imposed.' 5' The
court stated that the punishment must fit the offender, rather than the
crime. 152 "There is a strong public interest in the imposition of a
sentence based upon an accurate evaluation of the particular offender
and designed to aid in his personal rehabilitation."' 153 These views
demonstrate the intent of some courts to tailor their sentences to the
needs and circumstances of each individual defendant and to aid the
defendant in his rehabilitation.
Rehabilitation, by itself, is not a satisfactory rationale for placing
an offender in prison. Even proponents of other theories, however,
recognize the benefit of rehabilitation. 154 Although an argument can
be made that the efforts to link rehabilitation to sentence length
145. VAN DEN HAAc & CONRAD, supra note 120, at 53.
146. Martinson, California Research at the Crossroads, 22 CRIME & DELIQUENCY
180, 190 (1976); Martinson Attacks His Own Earlier Work, CRIMINAL JUSTICE NEws-
LE'rER, vol. 9, No. 24, at 4 (Dec. 4, 1978).
147. See e.g., Palmer, Martinson Revisited, 12 J. RESEARCH IN CRIME & DELI-
QUENCY 133, 150 (1975).
148. 605 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1979).
149. Id. at 513 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).
150. 688 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1982).
151. Id. at 1276.
152. Id. at 1277.
153. Id.
154. See SINGER, supra note 60, at 97-100; Morris, Punishment and Prisons, in
JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT 157, 162 (J. Cederblom & W. Blizek eds. 1977).
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should be abandoned, rehabilitation does have its place inside the
prison. 155 While rehabilitation is possibly not the ultimate or primary
goal of sentencing, it should be the ultimate goal of the correctional
system. 1 5
E. Retribution
Retribution or "just deserts,"' 157 is a concept based on a moral theory
of criminal culpability. 158 The goal of retribution is to remedy the
injustice caused by the offender's illegal act or omission through a just
and proportionate sentence. 59 The rationale is based on the premise
that individual members of society voluntarily assume obedience to
the criminal justice system in exchange for obtaining society's social
benefits 16 0 and that a balance of burdens and benefits is established.
Within this framework, each member of society is responsible for his
actions, and has the freedom of choice to engage in or refrain from
criminal activity.' 6 ' When a member of society chooses to break the
law, the theory of retribution requires that a punishment proportion-
ate to the offense be imposed on the offender. The punishment is a
"repayment" for the harm committed, 6 2 which ideally will offset any
The current cry is that "nothing works" and that, therefore, rehabilitation
should be abandoned. This seems to be most superficial. What should be
abandoned is the link between coercive efforts at rehabilitation and the
duration of detention. The cage is not a sensible place in which to cure the
criminal even when the medical analogy makes sense-which it rarely
does. So, I want more rehabilitative programs in prison, even though
rehabilitation is not a purpose of imprisonment.
Id. at 162.
155. SicER, supra note 60, at 98. The author states that not only should more
opportunities and programs be made available in the prison system for the prisoners,
but also that prisoners should be able to work for wages and thereby buy their way
into programs offered by private industry. However, "all these rehabilitative pro-
grams are desirable and important; but time in prison should not be determined by
program participation or by perceived progress toward rehabilitation. Sanctions
imposed and the punishment visited upon offenders should depend upon their
crimes." Id. at 98.
156. Id.
157. KREss, supra note 56, at 231; VON HIRSCH, supra note 42, at 45-46.
158. Pugsley, supra note 9, at 398.
159. See infra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
160. Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475, 479 (1968)("[i]t is only
reasonable that those who voluntarily comply with the rules be provided some
assurance that they will not be assuming burdens which others are unprepared to
assume"; "[t]heir dispositions to comply voluntarily will diminish as they learn that
others are with impunity renouncing burdens they are assuming"); Pugsley, supra
note 9, at 398.
161. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 39, at 11.
162. VAN DEN HAAG & CONRAD, supra note 120, at 55.
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benefit the offender may have received from the illegal activity.6 3
Retributivists believe that, when punishing the guilty, society has
the duty to impose sanctions. 64 The duty to impose punishment cen-
ters around the idea of "unjust enrichment." Punishing the offender
disgorges that benefit the offender received unjustly from the illegal
activity and restores the equilibrium of benefits and burdens in soci-
ety. 165
This rationale for punishment is also considered by many criminal
justice theorists as a reaffirmation of society's commitment to the
status quo regarding legal and illegal behavior. Retributivists are
concerned primarily with the gravity of the offense committed and
not necessarily with the side effects on the offender once the punish-
ment is imposed. 16 This narrow concern has been criticized by the
proponents of the "forward looking" rationales-deterrence, rehabili-
tation and incapacitation. 167 Retribution seeks to punish the offender
for his illegal acts with a sentence proportionate to the offense com-
mitted, and is not primarily concerned with the effects the sentence
may have on controlling or influencing offenders in the future. 168
The cornerstone of retribution is the proportionality between the
punishment imposed and the offense committed. Retributivists at-
tempt to structure the punishment to fit the crime and have referred
163. Id.
164. GOLDING, supra note 58, at 90.
165. Morris, supra note 160, at 478.
A person who violates the rules has something others have-the benefits of
the system-but by renouncing what others have assumed, the burdens of
self restraint, he has acquired an unfair advantage. Matters are not even
until this advantage is in some way erased. . . . Justice-that is, punishing
such individuals-restores the equilibrium of benefits and burdens.
Id. at 478.
166. See GOLDING, supra note 58, at 84; voN HIRscH, supra note 42, at 46-47;
Harris, supra note 126; Hospers, supra note 59, at 22 ("the justification of punish-
ment lies in the commission of past acts .... "; "[i]t is possible, even desirable, for a
prisoner to be improved and rehabilitated during his term, but this is a fringe-
benefit, not the purpose of punishing him . . .").
167. B. WoorroN, CrME AND THE CIMINAL LAw 56 (1963)(retribution is back-
ward-looking and therefore is not worthy of consideration); Bedau, Concessions to
Retribution in Punishment, in JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT 53 (J. Cederblom & W.
Blizek eds. 1977)(retribution is "necessarily backward-looking in its orientation to
punishment"; "[i]ts focus is on the offense . . . , not [on] any social cost/benefit or
individual eugenics . . . "; it ignores features of individual offender and effect of
threat or infliction of punishment); Wasserstrom, Some Problems With Theories of
Punishment, in JUs'rIcE AND PUNISHMENT, 173, 187 (J. Cederblom & W. Blizek eds.
1977) (retribution "is in some fundamental sense backward-looking; that is it is an
unpleasantness that is only properly imposed in the way that it is because it is
deserved; it is an unpleasantness that has been preceded by wrongdoing and is
publicly responsive to it").
168. See supra note 166.
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to this concept as "commensurate deserts." 169 Opponents of retribu-
tion, however, argue that there is no rational method to determine the
proportionality between a specific crime and an imposition of punish-
ment. 170 Since absolute standards regarding proportionality do not
exist, they claim retribution lends itself to greater subjective and
individualized standards than do deterrence and rehabilitation.' 7 ' If
retribution required exact proportions of punishment, this criticism
would be correct. However, retributivists have stated that precise
measurements of proportionality are not only unachievable in any
system, 172 but also are not required in order to satisfy the standards of
retribution. They believe that a "rough" estimate of proportionality is
sufficient. 173 The principle of "commensurate deserts" is founded
upon common sense notions of justice and equity which view dispro-
portionate sentences as inherently unfair. 174 Legislators in construing
statutes or judges in imposing sentences have the ability to fashion a
proper and deserved sentence.
Retributivists also argue that their theory of punishment meets the
needs of society to condemn illegal conduct, a principle referred to as
the "expressive function of punishment.' 1 75 This principle holds that
society needs to punish the offender in order to restore social order, 176
169. KRss, supra note 56, at 231-32; VON HIRsCHi, supra note 42, at 64-76;
Hospers, supra note 59, at 22-24.
170. Bedau, supra note 167, at 64-66; Heinz, Heinz, Senderowitz, & Vance,
Sentencing by Parole Board: An Evaluation, 67 J. CaIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 28
(1976).
171. Bedau, supra note 167, at 64-66.
172. SINGER, supra note 60, at 29.
173. SINGER, supra note 60, at 29; Golding, supra note 44, at 96, 104; Pincoffs,
Are Questions of Desert Decidable? in JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT 75, 85 (J. Cederblom
& W. Blizek eds. 1977).
174. VON HIRSCH, supra note 42, at 69-70.
175. J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 98, 118 (1970).
What justice demands is that the condemnatory aspect of the punishment
suit the crime, that the crime be of a kind that is truly worthy of reproba-
tion. Further, the degree of disapproval expressed by the punishment
should "fit" the crime only in the unproblematic sense that the more
serious crimes should receive stronger disapproval than the less serious
ones, the seriousness of the crime being determined by the amount of harm
it generally causes and the degree to which people are disposed to commit
it.
Id. at 118.
176. See People v. Gittelson, 25 A.D.2d 265, 269, 268 N.Y.S.2d 779, 784 (1st
Dep't 1966) (sentence should "encompass the community's condemnation of the
defendant's misconduct") (quoting People v. Silver, 10 A.D.2d 274, 276, 199 N.Y.S.
2d 254, 256 (1st Dep't 1960)); People v. Warren, 79 Misc. 2d 777, 781-84, 360
N.Y.S.2d 961, 965 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1974); MUELLER, supra note 56, at 43-44
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and has been endorsed by the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court in People v. Jacobsohn in which the court stated that a
"[s]entence must . . . encompass community's condemnation of de-
fendant's misconduct ..... 177 One commentator has stated that in
retribution sentences, "[s]ociety is responding to its emotional need for
the 'deliberate infliction of pain and hardship upon the offender'.' 1 78
This characteristic is one of the distinguishing factors of retribution,
since the theory not only vindicates the criminal justice system, but
also reaffirms and supports society's values regarding right and
wrong. 179
Opponents of retribution often argue that this rationale is simply
"legal vengeance."' °80 However, a distinction can be drawn between
revenge and retribution. One scholar explained that
[r]evenge is a private matter, a wish to "get even" with a person
one feels has injured one, whether or not what that person did was
legal. Unlike revenge, retribution is legally threatened beforehand
for an act prohibited by law. It is imposed by due process and only
for a crime, as threatened by law. Retribution is also limited by
law. Retribution may be exacted when there is no personal injury
and no wish for revenge; conversely, revenge may be carried out
when there was neither a crime nor a real injury. The desire for
revenge is a personal feeling. Retribution is a legally imposed social
institution. 181
Retribution as a justification of punishment began to dominate
sentencing philosophy in the late 1960s and early 1970s' 82 for a variety
of reasons.18 3 During this period, there has been support in the United
States Supreme Court for advocating and validating the use of retribu-
tion in fashioning sentences. In Gregg v. Georgia, 184 the Court stated
(retribution is primeval urge that is within us all; it would be irrational to ignore its
existence); O'DONNELL, CHURGIN & CURTIS, supra note 44, at 48-49; Hospers, supra
note 59, at 22.
177. 60 A.D.2d 607, 608-09, 400 N.Y.S.2d 136, 139 (2d Dep't 1977). See also,
People v. Cotter, 25 A.D.2d 609, 610, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 679, 680 (4th Dep't 1966);
People v. Notey, 72 A.D.2d 279, 282, 423 N.Y.S.2d 947, 950 (2d Dep't 1980).
178. CAMPBELL, supra note 118, at 31 (quoting JOHNSON, CRIME, CORRECTION AND
SociErY 173 (3d ed. 1974)).
179. FEINBERG, supra note 175, at 118; MUELLER, supra note 56, at 40-45.
180. GIBBS, supra note 61, at 82-83.
181. VAN DEN HAAC & CONRAD, supra note 120, at 246. See also Hospers, supra
note 59, at 22 (retribution is not "punishment for punishment's sake, nor the inflic-
tion of pain for pain's sake, . . . it is rather punishment for the sake of justice";
"[m]otives other than the desire for justice are irrelevant").
182. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
183. id.
184. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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that retribution "may be unappealing to many, but it is essential in an
ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather
than self-help to vindicate their wrongs.' ' 185 In 1972, Justice Stewart,
concurring in Furman v. Georgia 186 stated that the Constitution did
not prohibit retribution as a justification for punishment.
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and
channelling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice
serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society
governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized
society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders
the punishment they "deserve," then there are sown the seeds of
anarchy-of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law. 87
F. Multiple Objectives in Criminal Sanctions
Although each of the four sentencing rationales is distinct and
unique in character, both courts and criminologists acknowledge that
rarely will a single sentence or sentencing policy encompass only one
of these principles. 88 Since society's requirements and purposes re-
garding the criminal law are multi-faceted, a sentence or sentencing
statute that reflects only one principle is inadequate. 89
When imposing an appropriate sentence, judges will often examine
and evaluate each of the philosophical rationales for punishment be-
fore choosing which one will provide an effective sentence. 9 0 Courts
will occasionally recognize the operation of all of the rationales in
supporting a single sentence.' 9 ' The Supreme Court in Jones v. United
185. Id. at 183.
186. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
187. Id. at 308.
188. Evans & Gilbert, The Sentencing Process: Better Methods Are Available, 39
FED. PROB. 36 (1975); Hart, The Aims of Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs.
401, 401 (1958); Note, Creative Punishment: A Study of Effective Sentencing Alter-
natives, 14 WASHBuRN L. J. 57, 57-59 (1975).
189. Hart, supra note 188, at 401.
190. See, e.g., United States v. Brubaker, 663 F.2d 764, 769-70 (7th Cir. 1981);
Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 1980); Howard v. Maggio, 540
F.2d 1280, 1282 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522, 528-29 (1st Cir.
1974); United States v. Carlston, 562 F. Supp. 181, 184-85 (N.D. Cal. 1983);
Mitchell v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 366, 368 (N.D. Fla.), vacated, 482 F.2d 289
(5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 485 U.S. 687 (1972); United States v. Mandracchia, 247 F.
Supp. 1, 4 (D.N.H.), vacated sub. nom, Pugliese v. United States, 358 F.2d 514 (1st
Cir. 1965); United States v. Leach, 218 F. Supp. 271, 274 (D.D.C. 1963), remanded,
334 F.2d 945 (D.D.C. 1964).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Kaylor, 491 F.2d 1133, 1139-40 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Carlston, 562 F. Supp. 181, 183-84 (N.D. Cal. 1983); People v.
1984] 923
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
States192 recognized that a specific sentence is chosen with respect to
society's view of punishment and the court's determination of the
proper response to the offender's conduct. Considerations of rehabili-
tation, retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation are all factors that
may properly be weighed in determining a proper sentence. 193
Other courts have considered the concept of multiple aims when
imposing a single sentence.194 For example, the Appellate Division of
the New York State Supreme Court stated:
The proper imposition of sentence is probably the most difficult
problem with which a [t]rial [j]udge is faced . . . . A sentence must
be fashioned strictly ad hominem, based almost entirely on how
society will probably be affected by the strictures placed on the
activities of a particular defendant. The process must take into
account several factors: the rehabilitative . . ., the incapacitative .
the deterrent effect . . ., and the vindictive [retributive].' 9
Therefore, it is not uncommon for a single sentence to incorporate
multiple punishment rationales. For example, in United States v.
Hedman,19 the defendants were convicted of conspiracy, extortion
and filing fraudulent income tax returns. The court acknowledged
consideration of rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence in fashion-
ing a proper sentence. However, since "white collar" crimes were
involved, it decided not to concern itself with rehabilitation. 197 Due to
the seriousness of the offenses committed, the judge decided to impose
"relatively stiff sentences"' 98 as punishment and to "teach the public
Burgh, 89 A.D.2d 672, 672, 453 N.Y.S.2d 783, 785 (3d Dep't 1982); People v.
Warren, 79 Misc. 2d 777, 783-84, 360 N.Y.S.2d 961, 965 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1974); People v. Notey, 72 A.D.2d 279, 282-83, 423 N.Y.S.2d 947, 950 (2d Dep't
1980).
192. 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983).
193. Id. at 3052. See also, Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1314 (1981); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-86 (1976)(opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, J.J.);
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 530-31 (1968); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 168-70 (1963); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
194. See, e.g., United States v. McCoy, 429 F.2d 739, 743-44 (D.D.C. 1970);
Castle v. United States, 399 F.2d 642, 652 (5th Cir. 1968); Briscoe v. United States,
391 F.2d 984, 986 (D.D.C. 1968); United States v. Akers, 499 F. Supp. 43, 44-45 (D.
Or. 1980); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 328 (N.D. Ala. 1976); People v.
Mosher, 24 A.D.2d 47, 48, 263 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766 (4th Dep't 1965).
195. People v. Golden, 41 A.D.2d 242, 243-44; 342 N.Y.S.2d 309, 310 (1st Dept.
1973).
196. 630 F.2d 1184 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
197. Although disregarding rehabilitation for these offenders of "white collar"
crimes, the court did not explain its reasoning. Id. at 1201.
198. Id.
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that 'corruption, greed and lawlessness' "199 are not acceptable prac-
tices, with the hope of deterring others from engaging in similiar
behavior .200
Similarly, in United States v. Bergman,2"' the court weighed the
four rationales of punishment when considering an appropriate sen-
tence. In this case, the defendant, a 64-year-old rabbi, pleaded guilty
to knowingly and wilfully participating in a scheme to defraud the
United States government. The court, in designing an appropriate
sentence for this defendant, analyzed each rationale's effect. Consid-
ering rehabilitation, the judge stated that no one should be imprisoned
for this purpose because imprisonment is punitive, not rehabilita-
tive. 20 2 If, however, the sentencer chooses to imprison the offender,
the court stated that rehabilitative programs should be made available
in prisons.203 The court determined that the incapacitation rationale
in this case is inappropriate simply because the defendant was not a
dangerous offender. 20 4 The court recognized that this offender was
unlikely to commit any further offenses in the future, hence there was
no need for specific deterrence. 20 5 The court did cite two aims of
punishment that are served by the imposition of a prison sentence:
general deterrence and retribution.2 06 Relying on the need to deter
others from committing similar acts in the future and to punish the
defendant for the serious offense committed, the court imposed a
prison sentence on the defendant. 20 7
Not only have sentences encompassed multiple objectives of crimi-
nal punishment, but some statutes have also been drafted with this
intent.20 8 For example, in the Proposed Federal Criminal Code,2 09 the
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 416 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
202. Id. at 499.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 500.
208. See, e.g., UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONER, MODEL SENTENCING AND CORREC-
TIONS ACT, § 3-101 (1979).
The purposes of this Article are to:
(1) punish a criminal defendant by assuring the imposition of a sentence he
deserves in relation to the seiiousness of his offense;
(2) assure the fair treatment of all defendants by eliminating unjustified
disparity in sentences, providing fair warning of the nature of the sentence
to be imposed, and establishing fair procedures for the imposition of
sentences; and
1984]
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drafters noted that the four rationales for punishment were the objec-
tives in imposing any sentence. Significantly, the Code noted that one
rationale may have more influence on the imposition of a sentence in a
specific case than does another rationale. 210 This point raises two
questions: (1) which rationale or rationales should a sentencing statute
serve, and (2) does the statute effectively further that rationale or
those rationales?
IV. The Amended Provision in Relation to the
Sentencing Rationales
The amended provision to New York's Penal Law section
70.30(1)(c) increases the severity of punishment by lengthening the
time of incarceration that the multiple felony offender may receive at
sentencing. 21 In order to understand and comply with the provision's
intent and effect, the sentencing judge should examine the statute in
relation to the four sentencing rationales.
One of the specifically stated purposes of the amended provision is
the seeking of retribution for the offender's acts, as expressed in the
executive 212 and the legislative 21 3 memoranda. The legislators stated
that, by increasing the sentence length for multiple felonies, they are
ensuring that the punishment will be commensurate with the of-
fense, 21 4 hence maintaining the social equilibrium of benefits and
burdens. This desire for a proportionate sentence is the cornerstone of
the retributive theory. 215 Another aspect of retribution expressed in
the memoranda is the community's condemnation of the illegal
acts. 216 The statute was amended in response not only to various
violent incidents, but also to society's need to inflict appropriate pun-
(3) prevent crime and promote respect for law by,
(i) providing an effective deterrent to others likely to commit similiar
offenses;
(ii) restraining defendants with a long history of criminal conduct; and
(iii) promoting correctional programs that elicit the voluntary coopera-
tion and participation of offenders.
Id. at 95.
209. See S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1980).
210. S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 934 (1980).
211. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
212. 1983 N.Y. Laws 2755.
213. 1983 N.Y. Laws 2462.
214. 1983 N.Y. Laws 2462, 2755.
215. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
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ishment on the multiple felony offenders 217 Therefore, a primary
intent of the amended provision is to seek retribution against the
multiple felony offender in order to restore the equilibrium in society
through the use of proportionate sentences.
Deterrence is another stated purpose of the amended provision. In
the legislative memorandum, 218 it is stated that the amended provi-
sion's effect will add a measure of deterrence to other future offend-
ers. 2 19 The commonly held belief that increased severity will serve to
deter future offenders 20 has been disproven in numerous studies. 22'
This research has concluded that simply increasing the severity of
sentences has little or no impact on the crime rate, Although severity
of punishment may serve other functions, "high degrees of severity
might be explained as reactive responses by legislators and judicial
personnel to high offense rates, particularly where the certainty of
punishment is likely to be low-as in urban areas. "222
Although some offenders might be deterred from engaging in multi-
ple felonies because of the increased prison length, a sentencing judge
should not interpret the statute as primarily one of deterrence. It is not
likely that the amended provision will deter crime merely through
increasing the length of imprisonment.
223
The theory of incapacitation is also mentioned as one of the justifi-
cations for extending the prison term for the multiple felony offender.
The legislative memorandum states that the amended provision in-
creases the ability to protect society by removing the offender from the
community. 224 The protection of society is the focal point of the
incapacitation rationale. 225 Clearly the statute, both before2 2 6 and
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after the amendment, 227 provides for incapacitation. However, the
additional intent behind the amended provision was to increase the
protection of society.228 Therefore, a judge should also consider inca-
pacitation for the protection of society when fashioning a sentence
under the amended provision for the multiple felony offender.
Nowhere in the statute or in the executive or legislative memoranda
is there any reference to the theory of rehabilitation. 229 Increasing the
length of imprisonment by itself will not increase the amount of
rehabilitation one receives. According to some studies, increased sen-
tences actually increased the recidivist rates.23 0 Any intent to rehabili-
tate the multiple felony offender would be better expressed by provid-
ing more effective rehabilitative programs in the prison system. The
absence of any reference to rehabilitation may also be explained by
the shifts in public opinion regarding the credibility and effectiveness
of the rehabilitative theory. 23 1
The "diner incident" 23 2 provides a forceful example of how judges
may properly regard sentencing the multiple felony offender under
the amended provision. In this occurrence, several gunmen went on a
crime spree, attacking approximately one hundred citizens. The de-
fendants pleaded guilty to over 750 counts of robbery, rape, sodomy,
weapons possession, and numerous other felonies. 233 If this incident
had happened after the amended provision took effect, the thirty year
sentence these criminals received most likely would have been in-
creased. It has been stated that retribution and incapacitation are the
primary aims behind the amended provision. 23 4 These offenders pose a
clear danger and, in order to protect society, the judge should impose
sentences to incapacitate them. Because of the number and severity of
violent felony offenses committed, the fifty year maximum sentence
allowed by the amended provision 235 is fair because it is commensu-
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rate with the gravity of the crimes. The fifty year maximum term of
imprisonment provides for a more retributive measure of punishment
against the offender than does the thirty year sentence allowed under
the old law. Had deterrence been the aim of the amended provision,
there is a greater possibility that the sentence imposed would be
unjust. Extended incarceration for purposes of deterrence may be
unjust without empirical proof that longer sentences deter. 21 6 Rehabil-
itation of the multiple felony offender in this instance is not an impor-
tant consideration in imposing the punishment.
Therefore, when sentencing the multiple felony offender, judges
should focus on two rationales for punishment. The first is the need
for retribution; the idea that the punishment imposed should be com-
mensurate with the gravity of the offense committed so that "justice"
will be done. The second is the need to protect society from the
multiple felony offender by incapacitating him through incarceration.
Although deterrence and rehabilitation are certainly beneficial effects
of any sentence, a judge should not rely on these rationales when
sentencing a multiple felony offender. Studies have demonstrated that
increased severity of time of imprisonment by itself does not deter. 237
In addition, there is no evidence to support the belief that rehabilita-
tion was one of the intended justifications for the amended provi-
sion. 238
V. Conclusion
New York State Penal Law section 70.30(1)(c)(ii)-(iii) is a retri-
butivist answer to the multiple felony offender. The intent of the
amended provision is twofold: (1) to do justice by implementing a
punishment more proportionate to the severity of the offender's crime
or crimes and (2) to incapacitate the offender by his extended removal
from society. When a judge is confronted with imposing a sentence on
a multiple violent felony offender, retribution as the primary reason
for punishment is not only consistent with the intent of the amended
provision, but also provides a just response to criminal behavior.
Retribution is and has been an accepted rationale for imposing pun-
ishment. The statute therefore deserves prompt judicial recognition.
Edward P. Abbot
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